Modal dependence logic was introduced recently by Väänänen. It enhances the basic modal language by an operator =(). For propositional variables p 1 , . . . , p n , =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) intuitively states that the value of p n is determined by those of p 1 , . . . , p n−1 . Sevenster (J. Logic and Computation, 2009) showed that satisfiability for modal dependence logic is complete for nondeterministic exponential time.
Introduction
The concept of extending first-order logic with partially ordered quantifiers, and hence expressing some form of independence between variables, was first introduced by Henkin [Hen61] . Later, Hintikka and Sandu developed independence friendly logic [HS89] which can be viewed as a generalization of Henkin's logic. Recently, Jouko Väänänen introduced the dual notion of functional dependence into the language of first-order logic [Vää07] . In the case of first-order logic, the independence and the dependence variants are expressively equivalent.
Dependence among values of variables occurs everywhere in computer science (databases, software engineering, knowledge representation, AI) but also the social sciences (human history, stock markets, etc.), and thus dependence logic is nowadays a much discussed formalism in the area called logic for interaction. Functional dependence of the value of a variable p n from the values of the variables p 1 , . . . , p n−1 states that there is a function, say f , such that p n = f (p 1 , . . . , p n−1 ), i. e., the value of p n only depends on those of p 1 , . . . , p n−1 . We will denote this in this paper by =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ).
Of course, dependence does not manifest itself in a single world, play, event or observation. Important for such a dependence to make sense is a collection of such worlds, plays, events or observations. These collections are called teams. They are the basic objects in the definition of semantics of dependence logic. A team can be a set of plays in a game. Then =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) intuitively states that in each play, move p n is determined by moves p 1 , . . . , p n−1 . A team can be a database. Then =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) intuitively states that in each line, the value of attribute p n is determined by the values of attributes p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , i. e., that p n is functionally dependent on p 1 , . . . , p n−1 . In first-order logic, a team formally is a set of assignments; and =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) states that in each assignment, the value of p n is determined by the values of p 1 , . . . , p n−1 . Most important for this paper, in modal logic, a team is a set of worlds in a Kripke structure; and =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) states that in each of these worlds, the value of the propositional variable p n is determined by the values of p 1 , . . . , p n−1 .
Dependence logic is defined by simply adding these dependence atoms to usual firstorder logic [Vää07] . Modal dependence logic (MDL) is defined by introducing these dependence atoms to modal logic [Vää08, Sev09] . The semantics of MDL is defined with respect to sets T of worlds in a frame (Kripke structure) W , for example W, T |= =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) if for all worlds s, t ∈ T , if p 1 , . . . , p n−1 have the same values in both s and t, then p n has the same value in s and t, and a formula =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) is satisfied in a world w in a Kripke structure W , if in the team T consisting of all successor worlds of w, W, T |= =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ).
MDL was introduced in [Vää08] . Väänänen introduced besides the usual inductive semantics an equivalent game-theoretic semantics. Sevenster [Sev09] considered the expressibility of MDL and proved, that on singleton teams T , there is a translation from MDL to usual modal logic, while on arbitrary sets of teams there is no such translation.
Sevenster also initiated a complexity-theoretic study of modal dependence logic by proving that the satisfiability problem for MDL is complete for the class NEXPTIME of all problems decidable nondeterministically in exponential time.
In this paper, we continue the work of Sevenster by presenting a more thorough study on complexity questions related to modal dependence logic. A line of research going back to Lewis [Lew79] and recently taken up in a number of papers [RW00, Hem01, HSS10, MMTV08] has considered fragments of different propositional logics by restricting the propositional and temporal operators allowed in the language. The rationale behind this approach is that by systematically restricting the language, one might find a fragment with efficient algorithms but still high enough expressibility in order to be interesting for applications. This in turn might lead to better tools for model checking, verification, etc. On the other hand, it is worthwhile to identify the sources of hardness: What exactly makes satisfiability, model checking, or other problems so hard for certain languages?
We follow the same approach here. We consider all subsets of modal operators , ♦ and propositional operators ∧, ∨, · (atomic negation), ⊤, ⊥ (the Boolean constants true and false), i. e., we study exactly those operators considered by Väänänen [Vää08] , and examine the satisfiability problem for MDL restricted to the fragment given by these operators. Additionally we consider a restricted version of the =() operator in which the arity of the operator is no longer arbitrarily large but bounded by a constant that is fixed for the considered logic. In each case we exactly determine the computational complexity in terms of completeness for a complexity class such as NEXPTIME, PSPACE, coNP, etc., or by showing that the satisfiability problem admits an efficient (polynomial-time) solution. We also extend the logical language of [Vää08] by adding classical disjunction (denoted here by ∨) besides the dependence disjunction. Connective ∨ was already considered by Sevenster (he denoted it by •), but not from a complexity point of view. In this way, we obtain a complexity analysis of the satisfiability problem for MDL for all subsets of operators studied by Väänänen and Sevenster as well as the arity bounded dependence operator.
Our results are summarized in Table 1 for dependence atoms of unbounded arity and in Table 2 for dependence atoms whose arity is bounded by a fixed k ≥ 3. Here + denotes presence and − denotes absence of an operator, and * states that the complexity does not depend on the operator. One of our main and technically most involved contributions addresses a fragment that has been called Poor Man's Logic in the literature on modal logic [Hem01] , i. e., the language without disjunction ∨. We show that for unbounded arity dependence logic we still have full complexity (Theorem 3.5, first line of 
Modal dependence logic
We will only briefly introduce the syntax and semantics of modal dependence logic here. For a more profound overview consult Väänänen's introduction [Vää08] or Sevenster's analysis [Sev09] which includes a self-contained introduction to MDL.
Syntax
The formulas of modal dependence logic (MDL) are built from a set AP of atomic propositions and the MDL operators , ♦, ∧, ∨, · (also denoted ¬), ⊤, ⊥, =() and ∨. The set of MDL formulas is defined by the following grammar
where n ≥ 1. All results are completeness results except for the P cases which are upper bounds.
All formulas in the first row will sometimes be denoted as atomic formulas and formulas of the form =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) as dependence atoms. The arity of a dependence atom =(p 1 , . . . , p n−1 , p n ) is defined as n − 1 and with MDL k we denote the set of all MDL formulas which do not contain dependence atoms of arity greater than k. We sometimes write
Semantics
A frame (or Kripke structure) is a tuple W = (S, R, π) where S is a non-empty set of worlds, R ⊆ S × S is the accessibility relation and π : S → P(AP ) is the labeling function.
In contrast to usual modal logic, truth of a MDL formula is not defined with respect to a single world of a frame but with respect to a set of worlds, as already pointed out in the introduction. The truth of a MDL formula ϕ in an evaluation set T of worlds of a frame W = (S, R, π) is denoted by W, T |= ϕ and is defined as follows:
Note the seemingly rather strange definition of vi). The rationale for this, given by Väänänen [Vää07, p. 24] , is the fact that if we negate v) and maintain the same duality as between iii) and iv) we get the condition
and this is only true if T = ∅. By ∨ we denote dependence disjunction instead of classical disjunction because the semantics of dependence disjunction is an extension of the semantics of usual modal logic disjunction and thus we preserve downward compatibility of our notation in this way. However, we still call the ∨ operator "classical" because in a higher level contextwhere our sets of states are viewed as single objects themselves -it is indeed the usual disjunction, cf. [AV09] .
For each M ⊆ { , ♦, ∧, ∨, · , ⊤, ⊥, =(), ∨} define the set of MDL(M ) (MDL k (M )) formulas to be the set of MDL (resp. MDL k ) formulas which are built from atomic propositions using only operators and constants from M .
We are interested in the parameterized decision problems MDL-SAT(M) and MDL k -SAT(M):
Question Is there a frame W and a non-empty set T of worlds in W such that W, T |= ϕ?
Note that, as Väänänen already pointed out [Vää08, Lemma 4.2.1], the semantics of MDL satisfies the downward closure property, i.e., if W, T |= ϕ, then W, T ′ |= ϕ for all T ′ ⊆ T . Hence, to check satisfiability of a formula ϕ it is enough to check whether there is a frame W and a single world w in W such that W, {w} |= ϕ.
As argued in [Vää07, Proposition 3.10], the downward closure property suits the intuition that a true formula expressing dependence should not becoming false when making the team smaller, since if dependence is true in a large set than it is even more so in a smaller set.
Complexity results
To state the first lemma we need the following complexity operator. If C is an arbitrary complexity class then ∃ · C denotes the class of all sets A for which there is a set B ∈ C and a polynomial p such that for all x, x ∈ A iff there is a y with |y| ≤ p(|x|) and x, y ∈ B.
Note that for every class C, ∃ · C ⊆ NP C . However, the converse does not hold in general. We will only need the following facts:
, ∃·PSPACE = PSPACE and ∃ · NEXPTIME = NEXPTIME.
Our first lemma concerns sets of operators including classical disjunction.
Lemma 3.1. Let M be a set of MDL operators. Then it holds:
Proof. a) follows from the distributivity of ∨ with all other operators. More specifically ϕ⋆(ψ ∨σ) ≡ (ϕ⋆ψ) ∨(ϕ⋆σ) for ⋆ ∈ {∧, ∨} and ∇(ϕ ∨ψ) ≡ (∇ϕ) ∨(∇ϕ) for ∇ ∈ {♦, }. 1 b) follows from a) with the observation that ∨ 2 |ϕ| i=1 ψ i is satisfiable if and only if there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , 2 |ϕ| } such that ψ i is satisfiable. Note that given i ∈ {1, . . . , 2 |ϕ| } the formula ψ i can be computed from the original formula ϕ in polynomial time by choosing (for all j ∈ {1, . . . , |ϕ|}) from the jth subformula of the form ψ ∨σ the formula ψ if the jth bit of i is 0 and σ if it is 1.
We need the following simple property of monotone MDL formulas.
Lemma 3.2. Let M be a set of MDL operators with · / ∈ M . Then an arbitrary MDL(M ) formula ϕ is satisfiable iff the formula generated from ϕ by replacing every dependence atom and every atomic proposition with the same atomic proposition t is satisfiable.
Proof. If a frame W is a model for ϕ, so is the frame generated from W by setting all atomic propositions in all worlds to true.
We are now able to classify some cases that can be easily reduced to known results.
1 Interestingly, but not of relevance for our work, ϕ ∨(ψ ∨ σ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∨σ).
is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The lower bound of a) was shown by Ladner [Lad77] , who proves PSPACEcompleteness for the case of full ordinary modal logic. The upper bound follows from this, Lemma 3.1 and ∃ · PSPACE = PSPACE. The lower bound for b) was shown by Hemaspaandra [Hem01, Theorem 6.5] and the upper bound follows from a) together with Lemma 3.2.
The lower bound for c) was shown by Donini et al.
[DLN + 92] who prove NP-hardness of the problem to decide whether an ALE-concept is unsatisfiable. ALE is a description logic which essentially is nothing else then MDL( , ♦, ∧, · , ⊤, ⊥) ( · and ⊤ are not used in the hardness proof). For the upper bound Ladner's PSPACE-algorithm [Lad77] can be used, as in the case without disjunction it is in fact a coNP-algorithm, together with Lemma 3.2.
d) follows from Lemma 3.2 together with the fact that every MDL formula with t as the only atomic subformula is satisfied in the transitive singleton, i.e. the frame consisting of only one state which has itself as successor, in which t is true. e) follows from the polynomial time complexity of deciding satisfiability of a 1CNF formula. f) reduces to Boolean formula evaluation by Lemma 3.2. Note that for e) and f) dependence atoms can be replaced by ⊤ because there we do not have any modality.
Poor man's dependence logic
We now turn to the Σ p 2 -complete cases. These include monotone poor man's logic, with and without dependence atoms.
Proof. Proving the upper bound for the second case reduces to proving the upper bound for the first case by Lemma 3.2. For the first case it holds with Lemma 3.1 that MDL-SAT( , ♦, ∧, · , ⊤, ⊥, ∨) ∈ ∃ ·coNP = Σ p 2 since MDL-SAT( , ♦, ∧, · , ⊤, ⊥) ∈ coNP. The latter follows directly from Ladner's PSPACE-algorithm for modal logic satisfiability [Lad77] which is in fact a coNP-algorithm in the case without disjunction.
For the lower bound we consider the quantified constraint satisfaction problem QCSP 2 ( R 1/3 ) shown to be Π An instance of QCSP 2 (R 1/3 ) consists of universally quantified Boolean variables p 1 , . . . , p k , existentially quantified Boolean variables p k+1 , . . . , p n and a set of clauses each consisting of exactly three of those variables. QCSP 2 (R 1/3 ) is the set of all those instances for which for every truth assignment for p 1 , . . . , p k there is a truth assignment for p k+1 , . . . , p n such that in each clause exactly one variable evaluates to true. 2 For the reduction from QCSP 2 (R 1/3 ) to the complement of MDL-SAT( , ♦, ∧, · /⊥, ∨) we extend a technique from the coNP-hardness proof for MDL-SAT( , ♦ Let p 1 , . . . , p k be the universally quantified and p k+1 , . . . , p n the existentially quantified variables of a QCSP 2 (R 1/3 ) instance and let C 1 , . . . , C m be its clauses (we assume w.l.o.g. that each variable occurs in at least one clause). Then the corresponding MDL( , ♦, ∧, ⊥, ∨) formula is
where p is an arbitrary atomic proposition and
For the corresponding MDL( , ♦, ∧, · , ∨) formula replace every ⊥ with ¬p.
To prove the correctness of our reduction we will need two claims.
"⇒: Suppose that ϕ i ∧ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ s is satisfiable for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Then ♦ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ♦ϕ r ∧ ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ s is satisfiable in a frame that consists of a root state and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r} a separate branch, reachable from the root in one step, which satisfies
For our reduction it is necessary that in each clause the variables are pairwise different whereas in QCSP2(R 1/3 ) this need not be the case. However, the Π p 2 -hardness proof can easily be adapted to account for this. 
is unsatisfiable (i) and such that there are no a, b ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} with a < b,
The latter condition is already implied by Claim 1 as it simply ensures that no subformula is selected after it has already been discarded in an earlier step. Note that ϕ v (i 1 , . . . , i 2m ) is unsatisfiable iff for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}: v(p i ) = 1 and i ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i 2m } or v(p i ) = 0 (and i / ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i 2m }) (i ′ ). We are now able to prove the claim. "⇐": For j = 1, . . . , 2m choose i j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that p i j ∈ C j ′ and v ′ (p i j ) = 1. By assumption, all i j exist and are uniquely determined. Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have that v(p i ) = 0 (and then i / ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i 2m }) or v(p i ) = 1 and there is a j such that i j = i (because each variable occurs in at least one clause). Therefore condition (i ′ ) is satisfied. Now suppose there are a < b that violate condition (ii). By definition of i b it holds that p i b ∈ C b ′ and v ′ (p i b ) = 1. Analogously, p ia ∈ C a ′ and v ′ (p ia ) = 1. By the supposition p i b ∈ C a ′ and p ia = p i b . But since v ′ (p ia ) = v ′ (p i b ) = 1, that is a contradiction to the fact that in clause C a ′ only one variable evaluates to true. "⇒": If ϕ v is unsatisfiable, there are i 1 , . . . , i 2m such that (i ′ ) and (ii) hold. Let the valuation v ′ : {p 1 , . . . , p n } → {0, 1} be defined by
Note that v ′ is a continuation of v because (i ′ ) holds.
We will now prove that in each of the clauses C 1 , . . . , C m exactly one variable evaluates to true under v ′ . Therefore let j ∈ {1, . . . , m} be arbitrarily chosen.
By choice of i j it holds that p i j ∈ C j . It follows by definition of v ′ that v ′ (p i j ) = 1. Hence, there is at least one variable in C j that evaluates to true. Now suppose that besides p i j another variable in C j evaluates to true. Then by definition of v ′ it follows that there is a ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 2m}, ℓ = j, such that this other variable is p i ℓ . We now consider two cases.
Case j < ℓ: This is a contradiction to (ii) since, by definition of ℓ, p i ℓ is in C j ′ as well as, by definition of i ℓ , in C ℓ ′ and i j = i ℓ .
Case ℓ < j: Since j ∈ {1, . . . , m} it follows that ℓ ≤ m. Since C ℓ ′ = C (ℓ+m) ′ it holds that p i ℓ+m ∈ C ℓ ′ and p i ℓ+m ∈ C (ℓ+m) ′ . Furthermore ℓ < ℓ + m and thus, by condition (ii), it must hold that i ℓ = i ℓ+m . Therefore p i ℓ+m ∈ C j and v ′ (p i ℓ+m ) = 1. Because j < ℓ + m this is a contradiction to condition (ii) as in the first case. << The correctness of the reduction now follows with the observation that ϕ is equivalent to
ϕ v and that ϕ is unsatisfiable iff ϕ v is unsatisfiable for all valuations
The QCSP 2 (R 1/3 ) instance is true iff every valuation v : {p 1 , . . . , p k } → {0, 1} can be continued to a valuation v ′ : {p 1 , . . . , p n } → {0, 1} such that in each of the clauses {C 1 , . . . , C m } exactly one variable evaluates to true under v ′ iff, by Claim 2, ϕ v is unsatisfiable for all v : {p 1 , . . . , p k } → {0, 1} iff, by the above observation, ϕ is unsatisfiable.
Next we turn to (non-monotone) poor man's logic.
Proof. Sevenster showed that the problem is in NEXPTIME in the case of ∨ / ∈ M [Sev09, Lemma 14]. Together with Lemma 3.1 and the fact that ∃ · NEXPTIME = NEXPTIME the upper bound applies.
For the lower bound we reduce 3CNF-DQBF, which was shown to be NEXPTIMEhard by Peterson et al. [PRA01, Lemma 5.2.2] 3 , to our problem.
An instance of 3CNF-DQBF consists of universally quantified Boolean variables p 1 , . . . , p k , existentially quantified Boolean variables p k+1 , . . . , p n , dependence constraints P k+1 , . . . , P n ⊆ {p 1 , . . . , p k } and a set of clauses each consisting of three (not necessarily distinct) literals. Here, P i intuitively states that the value of p i only depends on the values of the variables in P i . Now, 3CNF-DQBF is the set of all those instances for which there is a collection of functions f k+1 , . . . , f n with f i : {0, 1} P i → {0, 1} such that for every valuation v : {p 1 , . . . , p k } → {0, 1} there is at least one literal in each clause that evaluates to true under the valuation v ′ : {p 1 , . . . , p n } → {0, 1} defined by
The functions f k+1 , . . . , f n act as restricted existential quantifiers, i.e., for an i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} the variable p i can be assumed to be existentially quantified dependent on all universally quantified variables in P i (and, more importantly, independent of all universally quantified variables not in P i ). Dependencies are thus explicitly specified through the dependence constraints and can contain -but are not limited to -the traditional sequential dependencies, e.g. the quantifier sequence ∀p 1 ∃p 2 ∀p 3 ∃p 4 can be modeled by the dependence constraints P 2 = {p 1 } and P 4 = {p 1 , p 3 }.
For the reduction from 3CNF-DQBF to MDL-SAT( , ♦, ∧, · , =()) we use an idea from Hemaspaandra [Hem01, Theorem 4.2]. There, PSPACE-hardness of MDL-SAT( , ♦, ∧, · ) over the class F ≤2 of all Kripke structures in which every world has at most two successors is shown. The crucial point in the proof is to ensure that every Kripke structure satisfying the constructed MDL( , ♦, ∧, · ) formula adheres to the structure of a complete binary tree and does not contain anything more than this tree. In the class F ≤2 this is automatically the case since in a complete binary tree all worlds already have two successors.
Although in our case there is no such a priori restriction and therefore we cannot make sure that every satisfying structure is not more than a binary tree, we are able to use dependence atoms to ensure that everything in the structure that does not belong to the tree is essentially nothing else than a copy of a subtree. This will be enough to show the desired reducibility.
Let p 1 , . . . , p k be the universally quantified and p k+1 , . . . , p n the existentially quantified variables of a 3CNF-DQBF instance ϕ and let P k+1 , . . . , P n be its dependence constraints and {l 11 , l 12 , l 13 }, . . . , {l m1 , l m2 , l m3 } its clauses. Then the corresponding MDL( , ♦, ∧, · , =()) formula is
where p 1 , . . . , p n , f 1 , . . . , f m are atomic propositions and l ′ ij :=
Now if ϕ is valid, consider the frame which consists of a complete binary tree with n levels (not counting the root) and where each of the 2 n possible labelings of the atomic propositions p 1 , . . . , p n occurs in exactly one leaf. Additionally, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} f i is labeled in exactly those leaves in which l i1 ∨ l i2 ∨ l i3 is false. This frame obviously satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii). And since the modalities in (iv) model the quantors of ϕ, f i is true exactly in the leaves in which l i1 ∨ l i2 ∨ l i3 is true and the =() atoms in (iv) model the dependence constraints of ϕ, (iv) is also true and therefore g(ϕ) is satisfied in the root of the tree.
As an example see Fig. 1 for a frame satisfying g(ϕ) if the first clause in ϕ is {p 1 , p n }.
. . .
If, on the other hand, g(ϕ) is satisfiable, let W be a frame and t a world in W such that W, {t} |= g(ϕ). Now (i) enforces W to contain a complete binary tree T with root t such that each labeling of p 1 , . . . , p n occurs in a leaf of T .
We can further assume w.l.o.g. that W itself is a tree since in MDL different worlds with identical proposition labelings are indistinguishable and therefore every frame can simply be unwinded to become a tree. Since the modal depth of g(ϕ) is n we can assume that the depth of W is at most n. And since (i) enforces that every path in W from t to a leaf has a length of at least n, all leaves of W lie at levels greater or equal to n. Altogether we can assume that W is a tree, that all its leaves lie at level n and that it has the same root as T . The only difference is that the degree of W may be greater than that of T .
But we can nonetheless assume that up to level k the degree of W is 2 ( * ). This is the case because if any world up to level k − 1 had more successors than the two lying in T , the additional successors could be omitted and (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) would still be fulfilled. For (i), (ii) and (iii) this is clear and for (iv) it holds because (iv) begins with k .
We will now show that, although T may be a proper subframe of W , T is already sufficient to fulfill g(ϕ). From this the validity of ϕ will follow immediately.
Claim. T, {t} |= g(ϕ).
Proof of Claim. We consider sets of leaves of W that satisfy f 1 ∧· · ·∧f m ∧ n i=k+1 =(P i , p i ) and that can be reached from the set {t} by the modality sequence k ♦ n−k . Let S be such a set and let S be chosen so that there is no other such set that contains less worlds outside of T than S does. Assume there is a s ∈ S that does not lie in T .
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and let s ′ be the leaf in T that agrees with s on the labeling of p 1 , . . . , p n . Then, with W, {s} |= f i and (iii), it follows that W, {s ′ } |= f i .
Let S ′ := (S \ {s}) ∪ {s ′ }. Then it follows by the previous paragraph that W, S ′ |= f 1 ∧ · · · ∧ f m . Since W, S |= n i=k+1 =(P i , p i ) and s ′ agrees with s on the propositions p 1 , . . . , p n it follows that W, S ′ |=
=(P i , p i ) and as it only differs from S by replacing s with s ′ it can be reached from {t} by k ♦ n−k because s and s ′ agree on p 1 , . . . , p k and, by ( * ), W does not differ from T up to level k. But this is a contradiction to the assumption since S ′ contains one world less than S outside of T . Thus, there is no s ∈ S that does not lie in T and therefore (iv) is fulfilled in T . Since (i), (ii) and (iii) are obviously also fulfilled in T , it follows that T, {t} |= g(ϕ). << (ii) ensures that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} there is a leaf in W in which ¬(l i1 ∨ l i2 ∨ l i3 ) ∧ f i is true. This leaf can lie outside of T . However, (iii) ensures that all leaves that agree on the labeling of l i1 , l i2 and l i3 also agree on the labeling of f i . And since there is a leaf where
The modality sequence k ♦ n−k models the quantors of ϕ and n i=k+1 =(P i , p i ) models its dependence constraints. And so there is a bijective correspondence between sets of worlds reachable in T by k ♦ n−k from {t} and that satisfy n i=k+1 =(P i , p i ) on the one hand and truth assignments to p 1 , . . . , p n generated by the quantors of ϕ and satisfying its dependence constraints on the other hand. Additionally, by ( * * ) follows that f 1 ∧· · ·∧f m implies m i=1 (l i1 ∨ l i2 ∨ l i3 ) and since T, {t} |= g(ϕ), ϕ is valid.
Cases with only one modality
We finally examine formulas with only one modality. b) For every MDL(M ∪ {=()}) formula ϕ it holds that ∨ is equivalent to ∨, i.e., ϕ is equivalent to every formula that is generated from ϕ by replacing some or all occurrences of ∨ by ∨ and vice versa.
Proof. Every negation ¬=() of a dependence atom is by definition always equivalent to ⊥ and can thus be replaced by the latter. For positive =() atoms and the ∨ operator we consider two cases. Case ♦ / ∈ M . If an arbitrary MDL( , ∧, ∨, · , ⊤, ⊥, =(), ∨) formula ϕ is satisfiable then it is so in an intransitive singleton frame, i.e. a frame that only contains one world which does not have a successor, because there every subformula that begins with a is automatically satisfied. In a singleton frame all =() atoms obviously hold and ∨ is equivalent to ∨. Therefore the (un-)satisfiability of ϕ is preserved when substituting every =() atom in ϕ with ⊤ and every ∨ with ∨ (or vice versa).
Case / ∈ M . If an arbitrary MDL(♦, ∧, ∨, · , ⊤, ⊥, =(), ∨) formula ϕ is satisfiable then, by the downward closure property, there is a frame W with a world s such that W, {s} |= ϕ. Since there is no in ϕ, every subformula of ϕ is also evaluated in a singleton set (because a ♦ can never increase the cardinality of the evaluation set). And as in the former case we can replace every =() atom with ⊤ and every ∨ with ∨ (or vice versa).
Thus we obtain the following consequences -note that with the preceding results this takes care of all cases in Table 1 . 
where every ψ i and σ i is a MDL(M ) formula and every a i is an atomic formula. If k > 0 or any a i is a literal, ⊤ or a dependence atom then ϕ ′ is satisfiable. Otherwise it is satisfiable iff one of the σ i is satisfiable and this can be checked recursively in polynomial time.
Bounded arity dependence
Theorem 3.8. Let k ≥ 0. Then the following holds:
Then by [Sev09, Theorem 6] there is an ordinary modal logic formula ϕ T which is equivalent to ϕ on singleton sets of evaluation, i.e., for all Kripke structures W and states w in W W, {w} |= ϕ iff W, w |= ϕ T .
Here ϕ T is constructed from ϕ in the following way: Let =(p i 1,1 , . . . , p i 1,k 1 , p i 1,k 1 +1 ), . . . , =(p i n,1 , . . . , p i n,kn , p i n,kn+1 ) be all dependence atoms occurring inside ϕ (in an arbitrary order and including multiple occurrences of the same atom in ϕ multiple times) and for all j ≥ 0 let
where α f (p 1 , . . . , p j ) is the propositional encoding of f , i.e.,
Note that for all f : {⊤, ⊥} j → {⊤, ⊥} and all valuations
Then ϕ T is defined as
where ϕ ′ (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is generated from ϕ by replacing each dependence atom =(p i ℓ,1 , . . . ,
Note that for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have that |α ℓ | ∈ O(2 k ℓ ) and |B k ℓ | = 2 2 k ℓ . Therefore
This means that ϕ T is an exponentially (in the size of ϕ) large disjunction of terms of linear size. ϕ T is satisfiable if and only if at least one of its terms is satisfiable. Hence we can nondeterministically guess in polynomial time which one of the exponentially many terms should be satisfied and then check in deterministic polynomial space whether this one is satisfiable. The latter is possible because ϕ ′ (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is an ordinary modal logic formula and the satisfiability problem for this logic is in PSPACE [Lad77] . Altogether this leads to MDL k -SAT(M ) ∈ ∃ · PSPACE = PSPACE.
b) In this case we cannot use the same argument as before without modifications since that would only lead to a PSPACE upper bound again. The problem is that in the contruction of ϕ T we introduce the subformulas α ℓ and these may contain the ∨ operator. We can, however, salvage the construction by looking inside Ladner's PSPACE algorithm [Lad77, Theorem 5.1]. For convenience we restate the algorithm in Listing 1. It holds for all ordinary modal logic formulas ϕ that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if satisfiable({ϕ}, ∅, ∅)= ⊤.
Listing 1: Algorithm satisfiable(T ,A,E) if T Atomic then choose ψ ∈ T \ Atomic // d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y ( but a r b i t r a r i l y)
n o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l l y guess i ∈ {1, 2} return s a t i s f i a b l e(T ′ ∪ {ψ i }, A, E ) elseif ψ = ψ 1 then return s a t i s f i a b l e(T ′ , A ∪ {ψ 1 }, E ) elseif ψ = ♦ψ 1 then return s a t i s f i a b l e(T ′ , A, E ∪ {ψ 1 }) end else if T is c o n s i s t e n t then if E = ∅ n o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y u n i v e r s a l l y guess ψ ∈ E return s a t i s f i a b l e(A ∪ {ψ}, ∅, ∅) else return ⊤ end else return ⊥ end end Here Atomic denotes the set of atomic propositions, their negations and the constants ⊤ and ⊥.
The algorithm works in a top-down manner and runs in alternating polynomial time. It universally guesses when encountering a operator and existentially guesses when encountering a ∨ operator -in all other cases it is deterministic. Now, to check whether ϕ T is satisfiable we first existentially guess which of the exponentially many terms should be satisfied and then check whether this term ϕ ′ (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is satisfiable by invoking satisfiable({ϕ ′ (α 1 , . . . , α n )}, ∅, ∅).
To see that this in fact gives us a Σ g(ϕ). The reason that this does not work is that we do not really ensure that a structure fulfilling g(ϕ) is not more than a binary tree, e.g. it can happen that the root node of the tree has three successors: one in whose subtree all leaves on level n are labeled with p 1 , one in whose subtree no leaves are labeled with p 1 and one in whose subtree only some leaves are labeled with p 1 . Now, the first diamond modality can branch into this third subtree and then the value of p 1 is not yet determined. Hence the modalities alone are not enough to express alternating dependencies and hence we need the =(p i ) atoms in part (iv) to ensure constancy. Proof. The lower bound for a) is due to the PSPACE-completeness of ordinary modal logic satisfiability which was shown in [Lad77] . The upper bound follows from Theorem 3.8a, Lemma 3.1b and the fact that ∃ · PSPACE = PSPACE. The lower bound for b) is Theorem 3.9. The upper bound follows from Theorem 3.8b, Lemma 3.1 and ∃ · Σ 
Conclusion
In this paper we completely classified the complexity of the satisfiability problem for modal dependence logic for all fragments of the language defined by restricting the modal and propositional operators to a subset of those considered by Väänänen and Sevenster. Our results show a dichotomy for the =() operator; either the complexity jumps to NEXPTIME-completeness when introducing =() or it does not increase at all -and in the latter case the =() operator does not increase the expressiveness of the logic. Intuitively, the NEXPTIME-completeness can be understood as the complexity of guessing Boolean functions of unbounded arity.
In an earlier version [LV10] of this paper we formulated the question whether there are natural fragments of modal dependence logic where adding the dependence operator does not let the complexity of satisfiability testing jump up to NEXPTIME but still increases the expressiveness of the logic. We can now give an answer to that question; by restricting the arity of the =() operator. In this case the dependence becomes too weak to increase the complexity beyond PSPACE. However, in the case of poor man's logic, i.e. only disjunctions are fobidden, the complexity increases to Σ p 3 when introducing dependence but it still is not as worse as for full modal logic. Intuitively, the complexity drops below NEXPTIME because the Boolean functions which have to be guessed are now of a bounded arity.
In a number of precursor papers, e. g., [Lew79] on propositional logic or [HSS10] on modal logic, not only subsets of the classical operators { , ♦, ∧, ∨, · } were considered but also propositional connectives given by arbitrary Boolean functions. The main result of Lewis, e. g., can be succinctly summarized as follows: Propositional satisfiability is NP-complete if and only if in the input formulas the connective ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is allowed (or can be "implemented" with the allowed connectives).
We consider it interesting to initiate such a more general study for modal dependence logic and determine the computational complexity of satisfiability if the allowed connectives are taken from a fixed class in Post's lattice. Contrary to propositional or modal logic, however, the semantics of such generalized formulas is not clear a priorifor instance, how should exclusive-or be defined in dependence logic? Even for simple implication, there seem to be several reasonable definitions, cf. [AV09] .
A further possibly interesting restriction of dependence logic might be to restrict the type of functional dependence beyond simply restricting the arity. Right now, dependence just means that there is some function whatsoever that determines the value of a variable from the given values of certain other variables. Also here it might be interesting to restrict the function to be taken from a fixed class in Post's lattice, e. g., to be monotone or self-dual.
Finally, it seems natural to investigate the possibility of enriching classical temporal logics as LTL, CTL or CTL * with dependence as some of them are extensions of classical modal logic. The questions here are of the same kind as for MDL: expressivity, complexity, fragments, etc.
